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IMPOSSIBILITY AND POSSIBILITY THEOREMS OF SOCIAL
CHOICE FUNCTION WITH RESTRICTED ALTERNATIVE SET
MASAFUMI TSURUTANI, MASASHI UMEZAWA, AND YOSHITSUGU YAMAMOTO
Abstract. We study the existence and properties of social choice function when individ-
ual’s alternative set is restricted: each individual expresses his/her preference on his/her
alternative set that is a subset of the whole set of alternatives. We define the strategy-
proofness and show that if at least one individual’s alternative set contains the range of
social choice function, the strategy-proofness is not coexistent with non-dictatorship. In
addition, we propose to weaken the strategy-proofness as well as the dictator, and show
the existence of a social choice function with eligible properties.
1. Introduction
We often encounter the problem of aggregating preferences of individuals in a soci-
ety. Arrow [2] introduced the social choice theory for this problem and established the
monumental impossibility theorem, and then Gibbard [4] and Satterthwaite [6] showed
the impossibility theorem concerning strategy-proofness. From then onward, difficulty of
the problem has been well recognized, and a variety of impossibility theorems in Arrow’s
or Gibbard-Satterthwaite’s framework has been developed. See Sen [7], Tanaka [8] and
survey papers in [3].
In this paper we study the existence and properties of social choice function when indi-
vidual’s alternative set is restricted: one expresses one’s preference on one’s alternative set
that is a subset of the whole set of alternatives. Accordingly, strategy-proofness and gen-
eralized strong positive association are defined. We show that if there exists an individual
whose alternative set contains the range of social choice function, the social choice function
satisfying strategy-proofness is dictatorial and one of such individuals is a dictator. After
showing the equivalence of generalized strong positive association and strategy-proofness,
we study the situation of mutual evaluation as a special case, and show the non-existence
of social choice function satisfying strategy-proofness. We then weaken the condition of
strategy-proofness as well as dictator and show the existence of a non-dictatorial social
choice function with eligible properties in a constructive manner.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the framework
and notation. In Section 3, we give an impossibility theorem when individual’s alternative
set is restricted. In Section 4, we focus on generalized strong positive association and
show the equivalence to strategy-proofness. In Section 5, we discuss the mutual evaluation
situation, redefine the strategy-proofness as well as the dictator, and present a possibility
theorem. Section 6 summarizes the results.
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2. Framework and Notation
Let us consider a society consisting of a finite number, say n, of individuals. Each
individual in the society has his/her own preference on the set X of a finite number of
alternatives. The problem faced by the society is to aggregate the individual preferences
into a society’s choice. The rule of choice is called the social choice function. In the
framework of Gibbard [4] and Satterthwaite [6], each individual in the society is interested
in the whole setX of alternatives, and his/her preference is defined as a preference ordering
on X. Preference ordering, denoted by %, is a binary relation on X satisfying
(i) completeness : x % y, y % x or both hold for any pair of alternatives x, y ∈ X, and
(ii) transitivity : if x % y and y % z, then x % z holds for any alternatives x, y, z ∈ X.
We say that x is weakly preferred to y when x % y. We write x ∼ y when both x % y and
y % x hold and say that x is indifferent to y. When x % y and y 6% x we write x Â y,
reading that x is strictly preferred to y. For a subset Y ⊆ X, we denote by % |Y the
restriction of binary relation % to Y , i.e., %|Y is defined on Y ×Y and x %|Y y if and only
if x % y and x, y ∈ Y .
Let W denote the set of all preference orderings on X and Wn denote its n-time Carte-
sian productW × · · · ×W︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
. We call an element, denoted by %p or simply p, ofWn a profile,
which is a combination of preference orderings %pi of individual i ∈ N . Then the social
choice function is a function that assigns an alternative of X to each profile. Throughout
this paper we denote the set of individuals by N = {1, 2, . . . , n} and assume that n ≥ 2
except Section 5, where n ≥ 3 is assumed.
Gibbard and Satterthwaite require strategy-proofness as one of the property that the
social choice function should acquire. The strategy-proofness and dictator are defined by
Gibbard and Satterthwaite as follows.
Definition 2.1 (Strategy-proofness in Gibbard-Satterthwaite’s Framework). We say that
the social choice function C : Wn → X is strategically manipulable by individual i ∈ N at
profile p ∈ Wn if there is a preference ordering %∈ W such that
(2.1) C(p/−i %) Âpi C(p)
holds, where
p/−i %= (%p1, ...,%
p
i−1,%,%
p
i+1, ...,%pn).
When C is not strategically manipulable, it is said to satisfy strategy-proofness.
The social choice function is required to avoid being strategically manipulable because
otherwise individual i can profit from misrepresentation of his/her preference ordering.
Definition 2.2 (Dictator). An individual k ∈ N is said to be a dictator if
C(p) ∈ {x ∈ R(C) | x %pk y for all alternatives y ∈ R(C) }
holds for each profile p ∈ Wn, where R(C) is the range of C defined by
R(C) = {x ∈ X | x = C(p) for some p ∈ Wn }.
Namely, the society always chooses an alternative out of those that the dictator prefers
best. A social choice function that admits a dictator is said to be dictatorial.
Gibbard [4] and Satterthwaite [6] independently proved that the strategy-proofness and
non-dictatorship are not coexistent.
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Theorem 2.3 (Gibbard-Satterthwaite’s Theorem). If the social choice function C : Wn →
X satisfies strategy-proofness in Definition 2.1 and |R(C)| ≥ 3, then it is dictatorial in
the sense of Definition 2.2.
There might be some individuals who are not allowed to express his/her preference on
the whole set of alternatives. To formulate such a situation we introduce the alternative
set on which individual i expresses his/her preference. For i ∈ N let Xi ⊆ X denote
individual i’s alternative set. We assume that |Xi| ≥ 2 for all i ∈ N and each alternative
x ∈ X belongs to some Xi, i.e., X =
⋃
i∈N Xi. For each i ∈ N let Wi denote the set of all
preference orderings on Xi. We write P = W1 ×W2 × · · · × Wn. Then the social choice
function for this situation, which will be denoted by D henceforth, assigns an alternative
of X to a profile p ∈ P, i.e.,
D : P → X.
Now we introduce several definitions on the social choice function D.
Definition 2.4 (Strategy-proofness (SP)). We say that the social choice function D : P →
X is strategically manipulable by individual i ∈ N at profile p ∈ P if there is a preference
ordering %∈ Wi such that
either D(p/−i %) Âpi D(p)
or {D(p), D(p/−i %)} 6⊆ Xi and D(p) 6= D(p/−i %).
holds, where
p/−i %= (%p1, ...,%
p
i−1,%,%
p
i+1, ...,%pn).
When D is not manipulable, it is said to satisfy strategy-proofness.
Individual i is not allowed to express his/her preference on the alternatives outside of
Xi. Therefore we have no big picture of his/her preference, and are forced to assume that
D(p/−i %) Âpi D(p) when {D(p), D(p/−i %)} 6⊆ Xi. This is the reason why we adopt the
above definition of strategy-proofness.
Definition 2.5. For a subset Y of X, N(Y ) denotes the set of all individuals whose
alternative set contains Y , i.e.,
N(Y ) = { i ∈ N | Y ⊆ Xi }.
Definition 2.6 (Dictator). An individual k ∈ N is called a dictator if
D(p) ∈ {x ∈ R(D) | x %pk y for all alternatives y ∈ R(D) }
holds for each profile p ∈ P. A social choice function that admits a dictator is said to be
dictatorial.
This definition is indeed the same as Definition 2.2, but it requires the dictator’s alter-
native set be large enough to contain the range of the social choice function.
Definition 2.7 (Generalized Strong Positive Association (GSPA)). The social choice func-
tion D : P → X is said to satisfy generalized strong positive association if it satisfies the
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following property for any pair of distinct profiles p and q ∈ P.
If either %pi=%
q
i for all i ∈ N({D(p)})
or there exists a nonempty subset of individuals M ⊆ N({D(p)}) such that
for all i ∈M,D(p) %pi x implies D(p) Âqi x for all x ∈ Xi \ {D(p)} and
for all j ∈ N({D(p)}) \M, %pj=%qj ,
then D(q) = D(p).
This means that if the alternative chosen by the society at profile p receives a not worse
evaluation from all individuals at profile q, then it is chosen also at profile q.
3. Impossibility Theorem
The main theorem of this section below states that if at least one individual’s alternative
set contains the range of social choice function, the strategy-proofness is not coexistent
with non-dictatorship.
Theorem 3.1. Suppose that the social choice function D : P → X satisfies the strategy-
proofness (SP) in Definition 2.4, |R(D)| ≥ 3 and N(R(D)) 6= ∅. Then it is dictatorial,
and the dictator is in N(R(D)).
We define the restriction r(p) of profile p = (%p1,%
p
2, · · · ,%pn) ∈ Wn as
(3.1) r(p) = (%p1|X1, %p2|X2, . . . , %pn|Xn),
and introduce a function C : Wn → X derived from the social choice function D : P → X
as
(3.2) C(p) = D (r(p)) for each p ∈ Wn.
Lemma 3.2. Suppose D : P → X satisfies the strategy-proofness (SP) in Definition 2.4.
Then the function C : Wn → X defined by (3.2) satisfies the strategy-proofness in Gibbard-
Satterthwaite’s sense, Definition 2.1.
Proof. We start the proof by assuming that C does not satisfy the strategy-proofness in
Gibbard-Satterthwaite’s sense, i.e., there exist an individual i ∈ N , profile p ∈ Wn and
preference %∈ W such that
C(p/−i %) Âpi C(p).
We will show that this assumption leads to a contradiction.
First note that
(3.3) r(p/−i %) = r(p)/−i(%|Xi)
by the definitions of profile p/−i % and restriction r. When {C(p), C(p/−i %)} ⊆ Xi,
we have D(r(p/−i %)) Âr(p)i D(r(p)). Therefore by (3.3) we see D(r(p)/−i(%|Xi)) Âr(p)i
D(r(p)), which contradicts the strategy-proofness (SP) of D in Definition 2.4.
When {C(p), C(p/−i %)} 6⊆ Xi, we have {D(r(p)), D(r(p/−i %)} 6⊆ Xi. We seeD(r(p)) 6=
D(r(p/−i %)) since C(p) 6= C(p/−i %). By (3.3), these facts again contradict (SP) of D in
Definition 2.4. ¤
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Proof of Theorem 3.1.
Since
(3.4) { r(p) | p ∈ Wn } = P,
we see
R(C) = R(D)
and |R(C)| = |R(D)| ≥ 3. This and Lemma 3.2 show that C defined by (3.2) is dictatorial
by Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem, Theorem 2.3. Namely, there is a dictator k ∈ N of
C, which satisfies
C(p) ∈ {x ∈ R(C) | x %pk y for all y ∈ R(C) }
for any profile p ∈ Wn. We will show that this individual k belongs to N(R(D)) and is a
dictator of D.
Assume that R(C) 6⊆ Xk, choose arbitrarily an alternative x ∈ R(C) \Xk, and consider
a profile p1 ∈ Wn such that
x Âp1k y for any y ∈ R(C) \ {x}.
Since individual k is a dictator of C, we see that C(p1) = x. Consider another profile
p2 ∈ Wn such that
y Âp2k x for some y ∈ R(C) \ {x},
%p2k |(X \ {x}) =%p1k |(X \ {x}) and
%p2j =%
p1
j for all j ∈ N \ {k}.
Again by the dictatorialness of individual k, we see C(p2) 6= x. Then D(r(p1)) 6= D(r(p2)).
On the other hand, we see
%r(p1)j =%
r(p2)
j for all j ∈ N \ {k}
since %p1j =%
p2
j for all j ∈ N \ {k}, and also
%r(p1)k =%
r(p2)
k
by the construction of profile p1 and p2 and the fact that x 6∈ Xk. Therefore r(p1) = r(p2),
implying D(r(p1)) = D(r(p2)). This is a contradiction, and hence we conclude that
R(C) ⊆ Xk, i.e., k ∈ N(R(D)).
Therefore we see that
D(r(p)) ∈ {x ∈ R(D) | x %r(p)k y for all y ∈ R(D) }
for each profile p ∈ Wn. By (3.4), we conclude that for each profile q ∈ P
D(q) ∈ {x ∈ R(D) | x %qk y for all y ∈ R(D) },
i.e., individual k is a dictator of D. ¤
4. Equivalence of Generalized Strong Positive Association and
Strategy-proofness
We will prove in this section the equivalence of generalized strong positive association
(GSPA) and strategy-proofness (SP).
Theorem 4.1. The social choice function D : P → X satisfies strategy-proofness (SP) in
Definition 2.4 if and only if it satisfies generalized strong positive association (GSPA) in
Definition 2.7.
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Proof of the Sufficiency. Suppose that there exists a social choice function D that satisfies
(GSPA) but not (SP). Then there is an individual i ∈ N , profile p ∈ P and preference
%∈ Wi such that
either D(p/−i %) Âpi D(p)
or {D(p), D(p/−i %)} 6⊆ Xi and D(p) 6= D(p/−i %).
Let us denote the profile p/−i % by q for the sake of simplicity.
First we consider the case where D(q) Âpi D(p). Partition Xi into two exhaustive and
disjoint subsets
U = {x ∈ Xi | x Âpi D(p) } and V = {x ∈ Xi | D(p) %pi x }.
Note that D(p) ∈ V and D(q) ∈ U . Then choose a preference %′∈ Wi such that
D(q) Â′ x for all x ∈ Xi \ {D(q)} and D(p) Â′ x for all x ∈ V \ {D(p)}.
Let us denote p/−i %′ by q′, and consider the social choiceD(q′) at profile q′. SinceD(p) %pi
x implies D(p) Â′ x for all x ∈ Xi \ {D(p)} and %pj=%q
′
j for all j ∈ N({D(p)}) \ {i}, we
see
(4.1) D(q′) = D(p)
by (GSPA) in Definition 2.7. Observe that D(q) %qi x implies D(q) Â′ x for all x ∈ Xi \
{D(q)} and %qj=%q
′
j for all j ∈ N({D(q)})\{i}. These imply by (GSPA) in Definition 2.7
that
D(q′) = D(q),
which by (4.1) yields D(p) = D(q), a contradiction.
Next, we consider the case where {D(p), D(q)} 6⊆ Xi and D(p) 6= D(q). When D(p) 6∈
Xi, we have i 6∈ N({D(p)}). Note that
%qj=%
p
j for all j ∈ N({D(p)})
since %pj=%
q
j for all j ∈ N \ {i}. Applying (GSPA) in Definition 2.7, we see that D(q) =
D(p), which is a contradiction. When D(q) 6∈ Xi, we have i 6∈ N({D(q)}), implying that
%pj=%
q
j for all j ∈ N({D(q)}).
Therefore D(p) = D(q) by (GSPA) in Definition 2.7, which again contradicts D(p) 6=
D(q). ¤
Proof of the Necessity. Suppose that there exists a social choice function D that satisfies
(SP) but not (GSPA).
First, we consider the case where there are two distinct profiles p, q ∈ P and a nonempty
subset of individuals M ⊆ N({D(p)}) such that
D(p) %pi x implies D(p) Âqi x for all x ∈ Xi \ {D(p)} and for all i ∈M,
%pj=%
q
j for all j ∈ N({D(p)}) \M, and
D(q) 6= D(p).
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LetM = {1, . . . ,m} and N \M = {m+1, . . . , n} (n ≥ m ≥ 1) by renumbering if necessary.
Consider the sequence of n+ 1 profiles
(%p1,%
p
2, . . . ,%pm,%
p
m+1, . . . ,%pn) = r0,
(%q1,%
p
2, . . . ,%pm,%
p
m+1, . . . ,%pn) = r1,
...
(%q1, . . . ,%
q
j−1,%
p
j ,%
p
j+1, . . . ,%pm,%
p
m+1, · · · %pn) = rj−1,
(%q1, . . . ,%
q
j−1,%
q
j ,%
p
j+1, . . . ,%pm,%
p
m+1, · · · %pn) = rj ,
...
(%q1, . . . ,%
q
m+1, . . . ,%
q
n−1,%pn) = rn−1,
(%q1, . . . ,%
q
m+1, . . . ,%
q
n−1,%qn) = rn.
Since D(r0) = D(p) and D(rn) = D(q), there exists an individual, say k ∈ N such that
D(rk−1) = D(p) and D(rk) 6= D(p). Let D(rk) = w and note that w might be equal to
D(q). Concerning k, the following three cases A, B and C are possible.
Case A: k ∈M .
Four possibilities should be considered for the preference of individual k at profile rk−1
between D(p) and w: D(p) Ârk−1k w, D(p) ∼
rk−1
k w, w Â
rk−1
k D(p) and {D(p), w} 6⊆ Xk.
We will show that each of four possibilities leads to a contradiction.
(1) If either D(p) Ârk−1k w or D(p) ∼
rk−1
k w, then we see D(p) Ârkk w since D(p) %pk x
implies D(p) Âqk x for all x ∈ Xk \ {D(p)}. This means that D(rk/−k %pk) =
D(rk−1) Ârkk D(rk), which is contrary to (SP), Definition 2.4.
(2) If w Ârk−1k D(p), then this means that D(rk−1/−k %qk) = D(rk) Â
rk−1
k D(rk−1),
which is also contrary to (SP), Definition 2.4.
(3) If {D(p), w} 6⊆ Xk, then this together with D(rk−1) = D(p) 6= w = D(rk) contra-
dicts (SP), Definition 2.4 since %rk−1j =%
rk
j for all j ∈ N \ {k}.
Case B: k ∈ N({D(p)}) \M .
We see that rk−1 = rk since %pi=Âqi for all i ∈ N({D(p)}) \ M . This implies that
D(rk−1) = D(rk), which is a contradiction.
Case C: k ∈ N \N({D(p)}).
Since D(rk−1) = D(p), we see that D(rk−1) 6∈ Xk, meaning that {D(rk−1), D(rk)} 6⊆
Xk. This together with D(rk−1) 6= D(rk) contradicts (SP), Definition 2.4 since %rk−1j =%rkj
for all j ∈ N \ {k}.
Next, we consider the case where there exist distinct profiles p, q ∈ P such that %pi=%qi
for all i ∈ N({D(p)}) and D(p) 6= D(q). Let N \N({D(p)}) = {1, ..,m} and N({D(p)}) =
{m+1, ..., n} (n ≥ m ≥ 1) by renumbering if necessary and consider the sequence of m+1
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profiles.
(%p1,%
p
2, . . . ,%pm,%
p
m+1, . . . ,%pn) = r0,
(%q1,%
p
2, . . . ,%pm,%
p
m+1, . . . ,%pn) = r1,
...
(%q1, . . . ,%
q
k−1,%
p
k,%
p
k+1, . . . ,%
p
m,%
p
m+1, . . . ,%pn) = rk−1,
(%q1, . . . ,%
q
k−1,%
q
k,%
p
k+1, . . . ,%
p
m,%
p
m+1, . . . ,%pn) = rk,
...
(%q1, . . . ,%
q
m−1,%pm,%
p
m+1, . . . ,%pn) = rm−1,
(%q1, . . . ,%
q
m−1,%qm,%
p
m+1, . . . ,%pn)) = rm.
Since %pi=%
q
i for all i ∈ N({D(p)}) = {m + 1, ..., n}, we see that rm = q hence D(rm) =
D(q). Then there exists k ∈ N \N({D(p)}) such that D(rk−1) = D(p) and D(rk) 6= D(p).
Let D(rk) = w. Since k 6∈ N({D(p)}), we have {D(p), w} 6⊆ Xk. This together with
D(rk−1) = D(p) 6= w = D(rk) contradicts (SP) in Definition 2.4 since %rk−1i =%rki for all
i ∈ N \ {k}. ¤
By the equivalence of two properties we have the following corollary from Theorem 3.1.
Corollary 4.2. Suppose that the social choice function D : P → X satisfies generalized
strong positive association (GSPA) in Definition 2.7, |R(D)| ≥ 3 and N(R(D)) 6= ∅. Then
it is dictatorial, and the dictator is in N(R(D)).
5. Social Choice Function for Mutual Evaluation
We consider in this section the social choice function for mutual evaluation. We assume
that there are at least three individuals, i.e., n ≥ 3, and each individual evaluates all
individuals in the society but him/herself. Namely, the set of alternatives coincides with
the set of all individuals in the society, i.e., X = N , and individual i’s alternative set Xi
is given by
Xi = N \ {i}.
We use Wi and P in the same manner as in the preceding sections. To avoid confusion we
denote the social choice function for mutual evaluation by Dm.
Firstly we will show that if the range of the social choice function is so large that any
individual can be chosen by the society, the function is strategically manipulable.
Theorem 5.1. There does not exist a social choice function Dm : P → X that satisfies
both (SP) in Definition 2.4 and R(Dm) = N .
The key to the proof of Theorem 5.1 is two-fold: the fact that strategy-proofness (SPP)
implies the following weak Pareto principle and the “cyclic” profile to be introduced in
(5.3).
Definition 5.2 (Weak Pareto Principle (WPP)). The social choice function Dm : P → X
is said to satisfy the weak Pareto principle if it holds that
i Âpk j for all k ∈ N \ {i, j} implies Dm(p) 6= j
for any pair of distinct individuals i, j ∈ N and for any profile p ∈ P.
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Lemma 5.3. If the social choice function Dm : P → X satisfies (SP) in Definition 2.4
and R(Dm) = N , then it satisfies (WPP) in Definition 5.2.
Proof. We suppose that there exists a social choice function Dm that satisfies (SP) and
R(Dm) = N but not (WPP). Then there exist a profile p ∈ P and distinct individuals
i, j ∈ N such that
i Âpk j for all k ∈ N \ {i, j} and Dm(p) = j.
Consider a profile q ∈ P such that
%qi=%
p
i ,
i Âqj k for all k ∈ N \ {i, j}, and
i Âqk j Âqk l for all l ∈ N \ {i, j, k} and for all k ∈ N \ {i, j}.
Observe that %pi=%
q
i and j %
p
k l implies j Âqk l for all l ∈ N \{j, k} and for all k ∈ N \{i, j}.
Note that (SP) is equivalent to (GSPA) and that j 6∈ N({j}). Then we obtain
(5.1) Dm(q) = Dm(p)
by applying (GSPA) to profiles p and q. Since i ∈ N = R(Dm), there exists a profile
s ∈ P such that Dm(s) = i. Between s and q we observe that i %sk l implies i Âqk l for all
l ∈ N \ {i, k} and for all k ∈ N \ {i}. Note that i 6∈ N({i}). Therefore
(5.2) Dm(q) = Dm(s)
by applying (GSPA) to profile s and q. From (5.1) and (5.2) we have
j = i,
which is a contradiction. ¤
Proof of Theorem 5.1.
We take the “cyclic” profile c defined by
2 Âc1 3 Âc1 · · · Âc1 n,
i+ 1 Âci i+ 2 Âci · · · Âci n− 1 Âci n Âci 1 Âci · · · Âci i− 1 for i = 2, · · · , n− 1,(5.3)
1 Âcn 2 Âcn · · · Âcn n− 1.
and consider what alternative Dm should choose at this profile. Take an individual i out
of N \ {n}, then i Âcj i+ 1 for all j ∈ N \ {i, i+ 1}, which means
Dm(c) 6= i+ 1 for i = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1
by Lemma 5.3. Concerning the individual 1 we see that n Âcj 1 for all j ∈ N \ {1, n},
meaning
Dm(c) 6= 1.
ThereforeDm(c) cannot be any alternative, and we conclude that the social choice function
Dm satisfying both (SP) in Definition 2.4 and R(Dm) = N is impossible. ¤
It is pointed out in [1] that the social welfare function for mutual evaluation degenerates
or does not exist due to the presence of cyclic profile in P. To exclude the controversial
cyclic profile Ohbo et al. [5] introduced individuals who are entitled to evaluate all individ-
uals in the society and proved the existence of a dictator among the introduced individuals.
Concerning the social choice function, we readily see, by applying Theorem 3.1, that ev-
ery social choice function satisfying (SP) in Definition 2.4 is dictatorial and one of the
introduced individuals is a dictator.
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We have assumed thus far that each individual is interested in all the individuals but
is allowed to express his/her preference on N \ {i}. We suppose hereafter that every
individual is interested in only N \ {i}. For this situation we redefine strategy proofness
(SP) in Definition 2.4 and dictator in Definition 2.6 as follows.
Definition 5.4 (Weak Strategy-proofness (WSP)). We say that the social choice function
Dm : P → N is strongly strategically manipulable by individual i ∈ N at profile p ∈ P if
there is a preference ordering %∈ Wi such that
Dm(p/−i %) Âpi Dm(p)
holds, where
p/−i %= (%p1, ...,%
p
i−1,%,%
p
i+1, ...,%pn).
When Dm is not strongly strategically manipulable, it is said to satisfy weak strategy-
proofness.
Note that we do not consider that Dm is manipulable when either Dm(p/−i %) or Dm(p)
is outside of N \ {i}.
We weaken the definition of dictator.
Definition 5.5. An individual i ∈ N is called a dictator for mutual evaluation if
Dm(p) ∈ { j ∈ R(Dm) | there does not exist k ∈ R(Dm) such that k Âpi j }
for any profile p ∈ P. The social choice function Dm that admits a dictator is said to be
dictatorial.
This definition, which does not require the dictator’s alternative set contain the range
of the social choice function, forms a contrast to Definition 2.6. The following theorem
claims the existence of a social choice function Dm of eligible property.
Theorem 5.6. There exists a non-dictatorial social choice function Dm : P → N for
mutual evaluation satisfying both weak strategy-proofness (WSP) in Definition 5.4 and
R(Dm) = N .
Proof. We will prove this theorem by induction over n, the number of individuals in
the society. Table 1 in Appendix demonstrates an example of non-dictatorial social choice
function Dm satisfying (WSP) and R(Dm) = N when N = {1, 2, 3}.1 That is, the theorem
has been proved when n = 3.
For h ≥ 3 let Nh = {1, . . . , h} and Whi be the set of all preference orderings defined on
Nh \ {i} for i ∈ Nh, and Ph =Wh1 × · · · ×Whh .
Assuming the existence of a social choice function Dhm : Ph → Nh which is non-
dictatorial and satisfies (WSP) and R(Dhm) = N
h, we will show that there exists a non-
dictatorial social choice function Dh+1m : Ph+1 → Nh+1 satisfying (WSP) and R(Dh+1m ) =
Nh+1.
For each profile p ∈ Ph+1, let
r(p) = (%p1|(Nh \ {1}), %p2|(Nh \ {2}), . . . , %ph|(Nh \ {h})).
That is to say, r(p) is the restriction of profile p ∈ Ph+1 to Ph. We define Dh+1m : Ph+1 →
Nh+1 as
(5.4) Dh+1m (p) =
{
Dhm(r(p)) when %
p
h+1= (1 Â 2 Â · · · Â h),
h+ 1 otherwise
1We carried out exhaustive enumeration for the case of N = {1, 2, 3} and found more than 1.6 × 109
different social choice functions satisfying the conditions in Theorem 5.6 .
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for each profile p ∈ Ph+1.
Firstly, to show that Dh+1m defined by (5.4) satisfies (WSP) we suppose the contrary,
i.e., there exists an individual i ∈ Nh+1, profile p ∈ Ph+1 and preference %∈ Wh+1i such
that
(5.5) Dh+1m (p/−i %) Âpi Dh+1m (p).
Letting q = p/−i % for the sake of notational simplicity, we consider the following two
possible cases.
Case A: i ∈ Nh.
If %ph+1 6= (1 Â 2 Â · · · Â h), then Dh+1m (p) = Dh+1m (p/−i %) = h + 1 by the definition
(5.4) of Dh+1m . Since this fact contradicts (5.5), we have %
p
h+1= (1 Â 2 Â · · · Â h),
implying that Dh+1m (p) = D
h
m(r(p)) and D
h+1
m (q) = D
h
m(r(q)). Then
Dhm(r(q)) Âr(p)i Dhm(r(p)).
However, since %pj=%
q
j for all j ∈ Nh+1 \ {i},
%r(p)j =%
r(q)
j for all j ∈ Nh \ {i}.
These contradict (WSP) of Dhm.
Case B: i = h+ 1.
Since %ph+1 is a preference ordering on Nh+1 \ {h+1} = Nh, we see that both Dh+1m (p)
and Dh+1m (q) are an element of N
h from (5.5). Therefore we have by the construction
(5.4) of Dh+1m that %
p
h+1=%= (1 Â 2 Â · · · Â h). This implies that q = p/−i %= p, which
contradicts (5.5).
Secondly, we will show R(Dh+1m ) = N
h+1. We have known from (5.4) that there exists
a profile p ∈ Ph+1 such that Dh+1m (p) = h + 1. Since { r(p) | p ∈ Ph+1 such that %ph+1=
(1 Â 2 Â · · · Â h) } = Ph and R(Dhm) = Nh from the induction assumption, we have
Nh ⊆ R(Dh+1m ). Therefore we see that R(Dh+1m ) = Nh+1.
Lastly, we will show thatDh+1m is non-dictatorial. Let j be an arbitrary individual inN
h.
Since Dhm is non-dictatorial, we see that there exist a profile p1 ∈ Ph and k, l ∈ Nh \ {j}
such that
k Âp1j l and Dhm(p1) = l.
Take a profile q1 ∈ Ph+1 such that
r(q1) = p1 and %q1h+1= (1 Â 2 Â · · · Â h).
Then Dh+1m (q1) = D
h
m(r(q1)) = D
h
m(p1) = l and k Âq1j l by the construction of profile q1,
implying that individual j ∈ Nh is not a dictator of Dh+1m .
Let p2 be a profile of Ph such that Dhm(p2) = 2.2 Consider a profile q2 ∈ Ph+1 such that
r(q2) = p2 and %q2h+1= (1 Â 2 Â · · · Â h).
We see that Dh+1m (q2) = D
h
m(r(q2)) = D
h
m(p2) = 2 and 1 Âq2h+1 2. These facts imply that
individual h + 1 is not a dictator of Dh+1m , either. Therefore we conclude that D
h+1
m is
non-dictatorial. ¤
2Dhm(p2) can be any natural number between 2 and h.
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6. Conclusion
We considered a society where each individual’s alternative set is restricted to a sub-
set of the whole set of alternatives. We have shown an impossibility theorem: the social
choice function satisfying strategy-proofness is dictatorial whenever at least one individ-
ual’s alternative set contains the range of social choice function. We also have shown
the equivalence of generalized positive association and strategy-proofness. We studied the
social choice function for mutual evaluation as a special case. Then we weakened the
condition of strategy-proofness as well as dictator, and showed the existence of a non-
dictatorial social choice function satisfying the weak strategy-proofness in a constructive
manner.
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Appendix
individual preference
1 2 Âp11 3
2 1 Âp12 3
3 1 Âp13 2
Dm(p1) = 1
individual preference
1 2 Âp21 3
2 1 Âp22 3
3 2 Âp23 1
Dm(p2) = 1
individual preference
1 2 Âp31 3
2 1 Âp32 3
3 1 ∼p33 2
Dm(p3) = 1
individual preference
1 2 Âp41 3
2 3 Âp42 1
3 1 Âp43 2
Dm(p4) = 1
individual preference
1 2 Âp51 3
2 3 Âp52 1
3 2 Âp53 1
Dm(p5) = 1
individual preference
1 2 Âp61 3
2 3 Âp62 1
3 1 ∼p63 2
Dm(p6) = 1
individual preference
1 2 Âp71 3
2 1 ∼p72 3
3 1 Âp73 2
Dm(p7) = 1
individual preference
1 2 Âp81 3
2 1 ∼p82 3
3 2 Âp83 1
Dm(p8) = 2
individual preference
1 2 Âp91 3
2 1 ∼p92 3
3 1 ∼p93 2
Dm(p9) = 2
individual preference
1 3 Âp101 2
2 1 Âp102 3
3 1 Âp103 2
Dm(p10) = 1
individual preference
1 3 Âp111 2
2 1 Âp112 3
3 2 Âp113 1
Dm(p11) = 1
individual preference
1 3 Âp121 2
2 1 Âp122 3
3 1 ∼p123 2
Dm(p12) = 1
individual preference
1 3 Âp131 2
2 3 Âp132 1
3 1 Âp133 2
Dm(p13) = 2
individual preference
1 3 Âp141 2
2 3 Âp142 1
3 2 Âp143 1
Dm(p14) = 3
individual preference
1 3 Âp151 2
2 3 Âp152 1
3 1 ∼p153 2
Dm(p15) = 3
individual preference
1 3 Âp161 2
2 1 ∼p162 3
3 1 Âp163 2
Dm(p16) = 2
individual preference
1 3 Âp171 2
2 1 ∼p172 3
3 2 Âp173 1
Dm(p17) = 2
individual preference
1 3 Âp181 2
2 1 ∼p182 3
3 1 ∼p183 2
Dm(p18) = 2
individual preference
1 2 ∼p191 3
2 1 Âp192 3
3 1 Âp193 2
Dm(p19) = 1
individual preference
1 2 ∼p201 3
2 1 Âp202 3
3 2 Âp203 1
Dm(p20) = 3
individual preference
1 2 ∼p211 3
2 1 Âp212 3
3 1 ∼p213 2
Dm(p21) = 1
individual preference
1 2 ∼p221 3
2 3 Âp222 1
3 1 Âp223 2
Dm(p22) = 1
individual preference
1 2 ∼p231 3
2 3 Âp232 1
3 2 Âp233 1
Dm(p23) = 3
individual preference
1 2 ∼p241 3
2 3 Âp242 1
3 1 ∼p243 2
Dm(p24) = 2
individual preference
1 2 ∼p251 3
2 1 ∼p252 3
3 1 Âp253 2
Dm(p25) = 2
individual preference
1 2 ∼p261 3
2 1 ∼p262 3
3 2 Âp263 1
Dm(p26) = 2
individual preference
1 2 ∼p271 3
2 1 ∼p272 3
3 1 ∼p273 2
Dm(p27) = 2
Table 1. Example of social choice function for mutual evaluation when
N = {1, 2, 3}
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